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Abstract
R&D investment has well-known liquidity problems, with potentially important
consequences. In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic
growth and social welfare in a Schumpeterian model with cash-in-advance (CIA) con-
straints on consumption, R&D investment, and manufacturing. Our results are as
follows. Under the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D (manufacturing), an
increase in the nominal interest rate would decrease (increase) R&D and economic
growth. So long as the e¤ect of cash requirements in R&D is relatively more important
than in manufacturing, the nominal interest rate would have an overall negative e¤ect
on R&D and economic growth as documented in recent empirical studies. We also an-
alyze the optimality of Friedman rule and nd that Friedman rule can be suboptimal
due to a unique feature of the Schumpeterian model. Specically, we nd that the
suboptimality or optimality of Friedman rule is closely related to a seemingly unre-
lated issue that is the overinvestment versus underinvestment of R&D in the market
economy, and this result is robust to alternative versions of the Schumpeterian model.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and social
welfare in a Schumpeterian growth model featuring cash-in-advance (CIA) requirements. In
the well-established tradition of CIA and economic growth, the CIA constraints appear on
consumption and on capital investment, as in the seminal study by Stockman (1981), further
developed by Abel (1985). In their line of argument, as long as physical capital acquisition has
cash requirements, the long-term capital-to-labor ratio is decreased by the nominal interest
rate, which acts as a tax on capital. However, existing evidence strongly supports the view
that R&D investment is even more severely a¤ected by liquidity requirements than physical
capital. For example, early studies by Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) nd
a positive and signicant relationship between R&D and cash ow in manufacturing rms
in the US, and a recent study by Brown and Petersen (2009) nds1 that the investment-cash
ow sensitivity largely disappears for physical investment, while it remains comparatively
strong for R&D. More recently, Brown et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that rms
tend to smooth R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form
of cash reserves. Aghion et al. (2012) also nd in their data2 that R&D is more a¤ected
by countercyclical monetary policy than physical investment, due to credit and liquidity
constraints.
To address this issue in a neat way, we build a scale-free variant of the quality-ladder
model a la Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), which incorporates
money demand into the quality-ladder model through a CIA constraint on R&D investment,
alongside the more conventional CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing expen-
ditures.3 Our main results can be summarized as follows. Under the CIA constraints on
consumption and R&D, an increase in the nominal interest rate would decrease R&D and
economic growth. This could be partially o¤set by a CIA requirement on manufacturing,
whereby an increase in the nominal interest rate may encourage R&D. However, as long
as the e¤ect of the CIA constraint on R&D dominates the e¤ect of the CIA constraint on
manufacturing, the nominal interest rate would have an overall negative e¤ect on R&D and
economic growth, as documented in recent empirical studies, such as Evers et al. (2007) and
Chu and Lai (2013).
We also analyze the long-run implications on social welfare and compare our results to
Friedmans (1969) proposed monetary policy rule, according to which the optimal nominal
interest rate should be zero. Since then, a large number of studies has analyzed the opti-
mality of Friedman rule in di¤erent economic environments; see for example, Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1997) for a discussion on some of the early studies, and Bhattacharya et al.
(2005), Gahvari (2007, 2012), and Lai and Chin (2010) for recent contributions. Until re-
cently, a close-to-zero nominal interest rate has been little more than a theoretical possibility,
rarely occurring in reality. However, since December 2008, the target range for the federal
funds rate in the US has been at zero to 0.25%. In October 2012, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) announced that it "currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels
1In their 1970-2006 US rm-level data.
2For 15 industrial OECD countries in the 1995-2005 period.
3See for example, Fuerst (1992) and Liu et al. (2008), who also analyze CIA constraints on manufacturing,
but they do not consider R&D and innovation in their analysis.
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for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015."4 Another
example is Japan, where the benchmark interest rate has been between zero and 0.1% also
since December 2008. In this paper, we nd that a zero-interest-rate policy can be subopti-
mal due to a unique feature of the Schumpeterian model that has been largely ignored in the
literature on monetary economics. Specically, we nd that the suboptimality or optimality
of Friedman rule is closely related to a seemingly unrelated issue that is the overinvestment
versus underinvestment of R&D in the market economy, and this result is robust to alter-
native versions of the model. Under inelastic labor supply, Friedman rule is suboptimal
(optimal) if and only if the equilibrium is characterized by R&D overinvestment (under-
investment). Under elastic labor supply, R&D overinvestment (underinvestment) becomes
necessary (su¢ cient) for Friedman rule to be suboptimal (optimal) due to an interaction
between the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment.
Our welfare analysis relates to the R&D-based growth literature. In this literature,
whether R&D underinvestment or overinvestment emerges in equilibrium is still an open
question. Jones and Williams (2000) show that a calibrated R&D-based growth model is
likely to feature R&D underinvestment because the positive externalities associated with
R&D dominate the negative externalities. A subsequent study by Comin (2004) shows that
this result is based on an assumption in the calibration that domestic total factor productivity
(TFP) growth is completely driven by domestic R&D. Then, he nds that if domestic R&D
only drives a small fraction of domestic TFP growth, there would be R&D overinvestment in
the economy, which he argues as the more likely scenario according to his simulation results.
We contribute to this literature by incorporating CIA requirements into a standard R&D-
driven growth framework with vertical innovation. In a previous attempt, featuring CIA and
horizontal innovation, a la Romer (1990), Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) prove the optimality
of the Friedman rule in the presence of CIA in the consumption sector.5 Their crucial
assumption is that the "non-cash good" fraction of consumption requires human capital
to process transactions. Therefore, an increase in the interest rate, by discouraging the
"cash good" consumption, increases the demand for transaction services, thereby reallocating
human capital from manufacturing and research into the payment production. This has a
negative level e¤ect and a negative growth e¤ect - by reducing human capital input from
R&D. Since in Romers (1990) structure R&D is always sub-optimal, the Friedman rule would
be second-best optimal. Unlike their model, which quite unrealistically assumes that liquidity
problems are absent in the R&D sector, we here allow for the presence of a CIA constraint
in the R&D sector as well, and single out a direct negative e¤ect of a higher nominal interest
rate on R&D without the need of any role of human capital in the transaction technology.
Moreover, the optimality of a positive nominal interest rate in the present study is driven by
the possibility of R&D overinvestment in the Schumpeterian growth model. This property
of R&D overinvestment is absent in the neoclassical growth model by construction and also
absent in the Romer (1990) model. Finally, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) consider a rst-
generation R&D-based growth model that features scale e¤ects; in contrast, we examine our
results in the two main versions of a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model.
This paper also relates to a recent study by Berentsen et al. (2012), who provide an
4Press Release of the FOMC meeting on October 24, 2012.
5See also a related model in Chu et al. (2012).
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interesting search-theoretic analysis of money and innovation. Specically, they consider a
search-and-matching process in the innovation sector and introduce a channel through which
ination a¤ects innovation activities. Our study complements Berentsen et al. (2012) in the
following ways. First, they consider a simple innovation process in the form of knowledge
capital accumulation that does not feature creative destruction and the business-stealing
e¤ect that are important elements of the Schumpeterian growth theory. Furthermore, it
is the presence of negative R&D externality in the Schumpeterian framework that gives
rise to the possibility of R&D overinvestment and the suboptimality of Friedman rule in
our study. Second, although the search-and-matching framework in Berentsen et al. (2012)
represents a useful and elegant microfoundation of the CIA constraint on R&D, our reduced-
form modelling of CIA constraints allows us to provide a tractable analysis of the interesting
interaction between the various CIA constraints on R&D, consumption and manufacturing.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary Schum-
peterian growth model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 4 considers
alternative versions of the model. The nal section concludes.
2 A monetary Schumpeterian growth model
In this section, we present the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. In summary, we
modify the quality-ladder model in Grossman and Helpman (1991) by allowing for elastic
labor supply and incorporating money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and
R&D investment.6 Furthermore, we allow for population growth and remove scale e¤ects by
incorporating a dilution e¤ect on R&D productivity following Laincz and Peretto (2006).7
Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, the standard features of the
model will be briey described below to conserve space.
2.1 Households
At time t, the population size of each household is Nt, and its law of motion is _Nt = nNt,
where n  0 is the exogenous population growth rate. There is a unit continuum of identical
households, who have a lifetime utility function given by8
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln ct +  ln(1  lt)] dt, (1)
where ct is per capita consumption of nal goods and lt is the supply of labor per person at
time t. The parameters  > 0 and   0 determine respectively subjective discounting and
6We consider this version of the model with CIA constraints on consumption and R&D as our benchmark.
However, we will also explore the implications of a CIA constraint on manufacturing in an extension of the
model; see Section 4.2.
7In Section 4.3, we consider a semi-endogenous-growth version of the model. See Jones (1999) and Laincz
and Peretto (2006) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
8Here we assume that the utility function is based on per capita utility. Alternatively, one can assume
that the utility function is based on aggregate utility in which case the e¤ective discount rate simply becomes
  n.
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leisure preference. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation:
_at + _mt = (rt   n)at + wtlt +  t   ct   (t + n)mt + itbt. (2)
at is the real value of assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate goods
rms)9 owned by each member of households, and rt is the real interest rate. Each member
of households supplies labor lt to earn a real wage rate wt. Each person also receives a
lump-sum transfer  t from the government (or pay a lump-sum tax if  t < 0). t is the
ination rate that determines the cost of holding money, and mt is the real money balance
held by each person partly to facilitate purchases of consumption goods. The CIA constraint
is given by ct + bt  mt, where  > 0.10 bt is the amount of money borrowed from each
member of households by entrepreneurs to nance R&D investment, and the return on bt is
it.
From standard dynamic optimization, we derive a no-arbitrage condition it = rt + t;
therefore, it is also the nominal interest rate. The optimality condition for consumption is
1
ct
= t(1 + it), (3)
where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The optimality condition for labor
supply is
wt(1  lt) = ct(1 + it), (4)
and the familiar intertemporal optimality condition is
  _t
t
= rt     n. (5)
2.2 Final goods
Final goods are produced by competitive rms that aggregate intermediate goods using a
standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt(j)dj

, (6)
where xt(j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. From prot maximization, the conditional
demand function for xt(j) is
xt(j) = yt=pt(j), (7)
where pt(j) is the price of xt(j).
9Final goods and R&D rms earn zero prot, so their ownership does not appear in the households
budget constraint.
10The usual CIA constraint on consumption is captured by the special case of  = 1; see for example,
Wang and Yip (1992). Here we parameterize the strength of the CIA constraint using . The literature
provides di¤erent ways to interpret this parameter; see for example Feenstra (1985) and Dotsey and Ireland
(1996).
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2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each
industry is temporarily dominated by an industry leader until the arrival of the next in-
novation, and the owner of the new innovation becomes the next industry leader.11 The
production function for the leader in industry j is
xt(j) = z
qt(j)Lx;t(j). (8)
The parameter z > 1 is the step size of a productivity improvement, and qt(j) is the number of
productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t. Lx;t(j) is production
labor in industry j. Given zqt(j), the marginal cost of production for the industry leader in
industry j is mct(j) = wt=zqt(j). It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view
of vertical innovation as in Peretto (1998).
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price pt(j) determined
by a markup  = pt(j)=mct(j) over the marginal cost. In the original Grossman-Helpman
model, the markup  is assumed to equal the step size z of innovation. Here we consider
patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Goh and Olivier (2002) by assuming that the markup
 > 1 is a policy instrument determined by the patent authority.12 The current formulation
also serves as a simple way to separate the markup  from the step size z. The amount of
monopolistic prot is
t(j) =

  1


pt(j)xt(j) =

  1


yt. (9)
Finally, production-labor income is
wtLx;t(j) =

1


pt(j)xt(j) =

1


yt. (10)
2.4 R&D
Denote vt(j) as the value of the monopolistic rm in industry j. Because t(j) = t for
j 2 [0; 1] from (9), vt(j) = vt in a symmetric equilibrium that features an equal arrival rate
11This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature. See Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of the
Arrow e¤ect.
12To capture patent breadth in our model, we rst make a standard assumption in the literature, see
for example Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom (2000), that once the incumbent leaves the market, she cannot
threaten to reenter the market. As a result of the incumbent stopping production, the entrant is able to
charge the unconstrained monopolistic markup, which is innity due to the Cobb-Douglas specication in (6),
under the case of complete patent breadth. However, with incomplete patent breadth, potential imitation
limits the markup. Specically, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts imitation; therefore, stronger
patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of imitation.
This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the
ability of the patentee to raise price".
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of innovation across industries.13 In this case, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rt =
t +
:
vt   tvt
vt
. (11)
This condition equates the real interest rate rt to the asset return per unit of asset. The
asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot t, (b) potential capital gain
:
vt, and (c)
expected capital loss tvt due to creative destruction, where t is the arrival rate of the next
innovation.
There is a unit continuum of R&D rms indexed by k 2 [0; 1]. They hire R&D labor
Lr;t(k) for innovation. The wage payment for R&D labor is wtLr;t(k); however, to facilitate
this wage payment, the entrepreneur needs to borrow money from households subject to
the nominal interest rate it. Each entrepreneur borrows the amount Bt(k) of money from
households. Following Feenstra (1985), we model the CIA constraint as a requirement that
the amount Bt(k) can only be repaid after a small time interval, say from t to t+t; in this
case, the cost of borrowing is Bt(k)
R t+t
t
isds  Bt(k)itt.14 To parameterize the strength
of this CIA constraint, we assume that a fraction  2 [0; 1] of R&D investment requires the
borrowing of money from households such that Bt(k) = wtLr;t(k). Therefore, the total
cost of R&D per unit time is15 wtLr;t(k)(1 + it), where we normalize  = 1 for simplicity
in this benchmark model but we will also consider the more general case of  2 [0; 1] in an
extension of the model.
The CIA constraint on R&D gives the monetary authority an ability to inuence the
equilibrium allocation of resources across sectors through the nominal interest rate.16 The
zero-expected-prot condition of rm k is
vtt(k) = (1 + it)wtLr;t(k), (12)
where the rm-level innovation arrival rate per unit time is t(k) = 'tLr;t(k), where 't =
'=Nt captures the dilution e¤ect that removes scale e¤ects as in Laincz and Peretto (2006).17
Finally, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation is
t =
Z 1
0
t(k)dk =
'Lr;t
Nt
= 'lr;t, (13)
13We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
14This approximation becomes exact under a constant nominal interest rate i. More generally, assuming
continuous trajectories and dening (t)  R t+t
t
isds, a rst-order Taylor approximation implies (t) =
(0) + 0(0)t + o(t) - where o() collects terms of order higher than one, i.e., limt!0 o(t)t = 0 - hence
(using Leibnizs rule)
R t+t
t
isds  itt.
15Assuming continuous trajectories, in an interval of length t, and up to a rst order approximation, the
wage paid is wtLr;t(k)t. The simple interest approximation of the previous footnote and paragraph adds
another Bt(k)itt = wtLr;t(k)itt to the cost of R&D. Hence, collecting terms, the total cost of R&D is
wtLr;t(k)(1 + it)t, which, divided through by t, gives the stated per unit time expression.
16Evers et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence that the ination rate and the nominal interest rate have
negative e¤ects on total factor productivity growth via R&D.
17In Section 4.3, we consider an alternative specication given by 't = '=Zt under which the model
becomes a semi-endogenous growth model as in Segerstrom (1998).
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where we have dened lr;t  Lr;t=Nt as R&D labor per capita. Similarly, we will dene
lx;t  Lx;t=Nt as production labor per capita.
2.5 Monetary authority
The nominal money supply is denoted by Mt, and its growth rate is _Mt=Mt. By denition,
the aggregate real money balance is mtNt = Mt=Pt, where Pt denotes the price of nal
goods. The monetary policy instrument that we consider is it because we are interested in
analyzing the optimal nominal interest rate. Given an exogenously chosen it by the monetary
authority, the ination rate is endogenously determined according to t = it   rt. Then,
given t, the growth rate of the nominal money supply is endogenously determined according
to _Mt=Mt = _mt=mt+t+n. Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue
as a lump transfer  tNt = _Mt=Pt = [ _mt + (t + n)mt]Nt to households.
Alternatively, one can consider the growth rate of money supply as the policy instrument
directly controlled by the monetary authority. Notice that in our economy, the consolidated
public sector, by manipulating the changes in money supply via lump-sum transfers to
households, is able to control the money growth rate _Mt=Mt and hence the nominal interest
rate. To see this, by the Fisher equation, it = rt + t, where t = _Mt=Mt   gt   n.18 By the
Euler equation, rt = + gt + n;19 therefore, the nominal interest rate is
it = rt + t = (+ gt + n) + ( _Mt=Mt   gt   n) = + _Mt=Mt,
which is determined by the growth rate of money supply.
2.6 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct;mt; lt; yt; xt(j); Lx;t(j); Lr;t(k)g and a time
path of prices fpt(j); wt; rt; it; vtg. Also, at each instance of time,
 households maximize utility taking fit; rt; wtg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms produce fytg to maximize prot taking fpt(j)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms produce fxt(j)g and choose fLx;t(j); pt(j)g to
maximize prot taking fwtg as given;
 R&D rms choose fLr;t(k)g to maximize expected prot taking fit; wt; vtg as given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that Lx;t + Lr;t = ltNt;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that yt = ctNt;
 the value of monopolistic rms adds up to the value of householdsassets such that
vt = atNt; and
18It can be shown that on the balanced growth path, mt and ct grow at the same rate.
19It can be shown that on the balanced growth path, 1=t and ct grow at the same rate.
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 the amount of money borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs is wtLr;t = btNt.
Substituting (8) into (6), we derive the aggregate production function given by
yt = ZtLx;t, (14)
where aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt = exp
Z 1
0
qt(j)dj ln z

= exp
Z t
0
sds ln z

. (15)
The second equality of (15) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (15)
with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology given by
gt 
:
Zt=Zt = t ln z = (' ln z)lr;t. (16)
As for the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the economy jumps to a unique
and saddle-point stable balanced growth path.
Proposition 1 Given a constant nominal interest rate i, the economy immediately jumps
to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path along which each variable grows at
a constant (possibly zero) rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
On the balanced growth path, the equilibrium labor allocation is stationary. Imposing
balanced growth on (11) yields vt = t=( + ) because _t=t = g + n and r = g +  + n
from (5). Substituting this condition into (12) yields t=(+ ) = (1 + i)wtLtr, where  is
given by (13), t is given by (9) and wt is given by (10). Using these conditions, we derive
(  1)lx = (lr + =')(1 + i), (17)
which is the rst equation that solves for flx; lr; lg. The second equation is simply the per
capita version of the labor-market-clearing condition given by
lx + lr = l. (18)
To derive the last equation, we substitute (10) into (4) to obtain
l = 1  (1 + i)lx. (19)
Solving (17)-(19), we obtain the equilibrium labor allocation as follows.
lr =
  1
+ i+ (1 + i)(1 + i)

1 +

'

  
'
, (20)
lx =
1 + i
+ i+ (1 + i)(1 + i)

1 +

'

, (21)
9
l =
+ i
+ i+ (1 + i)(1 + i)

1 +

'

  
'
. (22)
Equation (20) shows that R&D labor lr is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i under
both elastic labor supply (i.e.,  > 0) and inelastic labor supply (i.e.,  = 0). Therefore,
economic growth g = (' ln z)lr is also decreasing in i in both cases; to see this result,
substituting (20) into g yields g =
h
( 1)('+)
+i+(1+i)(1+i)
  
i
ln z. This negative e¤ect of i on
g is consistent with empirical evidence in Chu and Lai (2013), who document a negative
relationship between ination and R&D. In our model,  = i r = i g(i)  n; therefore,
an increase in i causes an increase in  and lx, and a decrease in lr, g and r.
Proposition 2 R&D and economic growth are both decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
Proof. Proven in text.
2.7 Socially optimal allocation
In this subsection, we derive the socially optimal allocation of the model. Imposing balanced
growth on (1) yields
U =
1


ln c0 +
g

+  ln(1  l)

, (23)
where c0 = Z0lx and g =  ln z = (' ln z)lr. We normalize the exogenous Z0 to unity.
Maximizing (23) subject to (18) yields the rst-best allocation denoted with a superscript .
lr = 1 
 (1 + )
' ln z
, (24)
lx =

' ln z
, (25)
l = 1  
' ln z
. (26)
We restrict the parameter space to ensure that lr > 0, which in turn implies that l
 > 0.
3 Optimal monetary policy and Friedman rule
In this section, we analyze optimal monetary policy and the optimality of Friedman rule. In
Section 3.1, we consider the special case of inelastic labor supply. In Section 3.2, we consider
the general case of elastic labor supply. Under elastic labor supply, we consider both cases
of the model with and without the CIA constraint on consumption. We use i to denote the
optimal nominal interest rate (i.e., the interest rate that maximizes social welfare) regardless
of whether or not it achieves the rst-best socially optimal allocations flr ; lx; lg; however,
we will explicitly discuss whether i achieves the rst-best allocations under each scenario.
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3.1 Friedman rule under inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider Friedman rule under inelastic labor supply, which is captured
by setting  = 0. In this case, the equilibrium allocation simplies to
lr =
  1
+ i

1 +

'

  
'
, (27)
lx =
1 + i
+ i

1 +

'

, (28)
and l = 1. From (27) and (28), it is easy to see that R&D labor lr is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate i, whereas production labor lx is increasing in i. Furthermore, given the fact
that the parameter  does not appear in (27) and (28), the CIA constraint on consumption
has no e¤ect on lr and lx under inelastic labor supply. In this case, the e¤ect of i operates
through the CIA constraint on R&D investment under which an increase in the nominal
interest rate increases the cost of R&D and leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to
production.
Under inelastic labor supply, the monetary authority may be able to achieve the rst-best
allocations flr ; lxg by choosing the optimal nominal interest rate i given by20
i = max

  (1 + '=) ln z
(1 + '=) ln z   1 ; 0

. (29)
The inequality i  0 is imposed to respect the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
If i = 0, then Friedman rule is optimal, but the monetary authority is unable to achieve the
rst-best allocations (unless i = 0 holds exactly and is not binding). If i > 0, then Friedman
rule is suboptimal, but the monetary authority is able to achieve the rst-best allocations
by setting i = i. It is well known that the quality-ladder model features both positive R&D
externalities, such as the intertemporal spillover e¤ect and the consumer-surplus e¤ect, and
negative R&D externalities, such as the business-stealing e¤ect.21 Therefore, the equilibrium
with i = 0 may feature either overinvestment or underinvestment in R&D. Comparing (27)
with (24) under  = 0, we see that i > 0 if and only if the equilibrium lr evaluated at
i = 0 is greater than the optimal lr . In other words, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. We summarize these
results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Under inelastic labor supply, the optimal nominal interest rate i is given by
(29). If and only if R&D overinvestment occurs in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium,
then the optimal nominal interest rate would be strictly positive; in this case, Friedman rule
is suboptimal. If and only if the optimal nominal interest rate is positive, then i achieves
the rst-best allocations flr ; lxg.
20It is useful to note that lr > 0 is su¢ cient to ensure that (1 + '=) ln z > 1.
21One could also introduce an additional negative externality in the form of an intratemporal duplication
e¤ect as in Jones and Williams (2000) by assuming decreasing returns to scale in (13) (i.e., t = 'l

r;t, where
0 <  < 1) in order to expand the parameter space for R&D overinvestment. However, this additional feature
would complicate our analysis, and the current framework that already features negative R&D externalities
is su¢ cient to illustrate our point.
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Proof. Impose  = 0 on (24) and compare it with (27). Then, a few steps of mathematical
manipulation show that lrji=0 > lr , i > 0.
Finally, as for the comparative statics of i (when it is strictly positive), it is increasing
in . Intuitively, a larger patent breadth increases R&D, which in turn implies that R&D
overinvestment is more likely to occur, so that i increases. It is interesting to note that under
inelastic labor supply, patent policy and monetary policy are perfectly substitutable in the
sense that a lower interest rate has the same e¤ect as a larger patent breadth. Also, i is
increasing in . When the discount rate is high, R&D overinvestment is more likely to occur,
so that i increases. Furthermore, i is decreasing in ' and z. When R&D productivity ' is
high or the step size z of innovation is large, R&D underinvestment is more likely to occur,
so that i decreases.
3.2 Friedman rule under elastic labor supply
Under elastic labor supply, monetary policy a¤ects the supply of labor. Equation (22) shows
that labor supply l is decreasing in i. Given that the nominal interest rate i now has a
distortionary e¤ect on the consumption-leisure decision, optimal monetary policy no longer
achieves the rst-best allocations.
We rst consider the case without the CIA constraint on consumption by setting  = 0.
Substituting (20)-(22) into (23) and di¤erentiating U with respect to i, we derive the optimal
nominal interest rate i for  = 0 given by
i = max

  


  1 ; 0

, (30)
where 
 is a composite parameter dened as follows.

  1 + 
1 + 

1 +
'


ln z   . (31)
It can be shown that lr > 0 is su¢ cient for 
 > 1. Therefore, Friedman rule is suboptimal
(i.e., i > 0) if and only if  > 
. It can also be shown that  > 
 is equivalent to R&D
overinvestment (i.e., lrji=0 > lr). In other words, R&D overinvestment is necessary and
su¢ cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal even with elastic labor supply so long as the
CIA constraint on consumption is absent (i.e.,  = 0). It is useful to note that when the
equilibrium features R&D overinvestment, setting i = i yields the rst-best allocation of
R&D labor (i.e., lrji=i = lr); however, setting i = i does not yield the rst-best allocations
of manufacturing labor and labor supply. Specically, we nd that lji=i < l because the
presence of a positive markup  > 1 reduces the labor share of income and distorts the
supply of labor. It can be shown that when i > 0, the inequality lji=i < l simplies to
 > 1. We summarize these results in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 When the CIA constraint on consumption is absent, R&D overinvestment
is both necessary and su¢ cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal even with elastic labor
supply. In this case, if and only if the optimal nominal interest rate is positive, then i
achieves the rst-best allocation of R&D labor lr ; however, it does not achieve the rst-best
allocations of manufacturing labor lx and labor supply l
.
Proof. Proven in text.
When the CIA constraint on consumption is present (i.e.,  > 0), there does not exist a
closed-form solution for the optimal nominal interest rate i. In this case, we analyze whether
Friedman rule is optimal. To do so, we substitute (20)-(22) into (23) and di¤erentiate U
with respect to i. Then, evaluating @U=@i at i = 0 yields
sign

@U
@i
ji=0

= sign

(1 + )

1 + 
1 + (1 + )

  1 + 
(1 + )

'+ 


ln z

, (32)
which can be positive or negative depending on parameter values. Comparing (24) with (20)
evaluated at i = 0, we nd that lrji=0 > lr is equivalent to the following inequality.
lrji=0 > lr , (1 + ) >
1 + 
(1 + )

'+ 


ln z. (33)
From (32) and (33), it is easy to see that when the CIA constraint on consumption is absent
(i.e.,  = 0), R&D overinvestment (i.e., lrji=0 > lr) is both necessary and su¢ cient for
@U=@iji=0 > 0, which implies that Friedman rule is suboptimal because social welfare is
increasing in i at i = 0. However, when the CIA constraint on consumption is present
(i.e.,  > 0), R&D overinvestment is no longer su¢ cient for @U=@iji=0 > 0; on the other
hand, R&D underinvestment is su¢ cient for @U=@iji=0 < 0. In this case, the degree of R&D
overinvestment must be substantial enough in order for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
Intuitively, in the presence of the CIA constraint on consumption, the nominal interest rate
causes an additional distortionary e¤ect on the consumption-leisure decision. As a result of
this additional distortion, R&D overinvestment is necessary but not su¢ cient to justify a
positive nominal interest rate. In other words, the suboptimality of Friedman rule requires
that the welfare gain from overcoming R&D overinvestment through the CIA constraint
on R&D dominates the welfare loss from distorting leisure through the CIA constraint on
consumption. We summarize this result in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 When the CIA constraint on consumption is present, R&D overinvestment
is necessary but not su¢ cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. However, if the degree of
R&D overinvestment is substantial enough, then Friedman rule would be suboptimal.
Proof. Comparing (32) and (33) shows that lrji=0 > lr is necessary but not su¢ cient for
@U=@iji=0 > 0. Suppose lrji=0 = lr + , where  > 0. There exists a threshold value  such
that if and only if  > , then @U=@iji=0 > 0. Furthermore,  is given by
   (1 + )
1 + (1 + )

' ln z
,
which is increasing in .
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3.3 Quantitative analysis
In this subsection, we conduct a numerical investigation on the optimality of Friedman rule.
We rst consider the case of inelastic labor supply. Specically, we examine whether the
range of parameter values that gives rise to R&D overinvestment and the suboptimality
of Friedman rule is empirically plausible. Under inelastic labor supply, the model features
the following set of parameters f; z; ; '; ig. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to
set the discount rate  to 0.05 and the step size z of innovation to 1.05. Then, we set the
markup  to 1.225, which corresponds to the intermediate value of the empirical estimates
reported in Jones and Williams (2000). To calibrate the R&D productivity parameter ',
we use the long-run growth rate of the US per capita GDP, which is about 2%. However,
we take into consideration Comins (2004) argument that long-run economic growth is not
entirely driven by domestic R&D investment. Comin (2004) nds that when domestic R&D
investment drives a small fraction of long-run economic growth, R&D overinvestment is likely
to arise. Chu (2010) nds that the fraction f of long-run economic growth driven by domestic
R&D investment in the US is approximately 0.4; therefore, we compute the optimal nominal
interest rate i for f 2 [0:4; 1], where each value of f corresponds to a specic value of '.
Finally, we set the market nominal interest rate i to the long-run average value of 8% and
use (27) and g = (' ln z)lr to compute the equilibrium growth rate predicted by the model.
Table 1: Calibration (inelastic labor supply)
f 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
g 2.0% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 0.8%
' 2.62 2.38 2.14 1.90 1.67 1.43 1.19
i 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6.6%
Table 1 reports the calibration results. We nd that Friedman rule is optimal for
f 2 [0:5; 1] under which the equilibrium features R&D underinvestment. However, when
the fraction of long-run economic growth driven by R&D investment is 0.4, which is an em-
pirically plausible value according to Chu (2010), the optimal nominal interest rate becomes
positive and is equal to 6.6% implying that Friedman rule is suboptimal in this case.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply. In this case,
we have two extra parameters f; g. We set  to 0.2 to match the long-run M1 money-
consumption ratio in the US, and this small value of  also helps to ensure that our calibrated
welfare e¤ects are conservative. As for , we choose its value to match a standard moment
of l = 0:3. Once again, we calibrate the value of ' using the equilibrium growth rate.
Table 2: Calibration (elastic labor supply)
f 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
g 2.0% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 0.8%
' 8.73 7.93 7.14 6.35 5.56 4.76 3.97
 2.22 2.22 2.21 2.21 2.20 2.19 2.17
i 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
U 2.61% 2.26% 1.90% 1.54% 1.19% 0.83% 0.48%
U( = 0) 2.08% 1.77% 1.46% 1.15% 0.84% 0.53% 0.23%
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Table 2 reports the calibration results. In this case, Friedman rule is optimal for f 2
[0:4; 1] implying that the optimal nominal interest rate is zero. As for the welfare gain from
reducing the nominal interest rate from 8% to 0%, we nd that it depends on the value
of f . When long-run economic growth is entirely driven by R&D investment (i.e., f = 1),
the welfare gain U is 2.61% of consumption per year.22 When the fraction of long-run
economic growth driven by R&D investment is 0.4, the welfare gain is 0.48% of consumption
per year. In the last row of Table 2, we report the welfare gain under  = 0 (while holding
other parameter values constant) in order to highlight the importance of the CIA constraint
on R&D. In this case, although the CIA constraint on consumption has no e¤ect on welfare,
the welfare gain through the CIA constraint on R&D remains nonnegligible and ranges from
2.08% (for f = 1) to 0.23% (for f = 0:4) of consumption per year.
4 Friedman rule under alternative cases
In this section, we consider various alternative versions of the model. In Section 4.1, we
examine an alternative case of the model in which only the CIA constraint on consumption
is present. In Section 4.2, we examine another alternative case in which the model features
CIA constraints on R&D and manufacturing. In Section 4.3, we consider a semi-endogenous-
growth version of the model.
4.1 Friedman rule under CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we examine an alternative case in which the model features only the CIA
constraint on consumption (but not the CIA constraint on R&D). In this case, (17) becomes
(  1)lx = lr + ='. (34)
Combining this equation with (18) and (19) yields the equilibrium labor allocation given by
lr =
  1
[1 + (1 + i)]

1 +

'

  
'
, (35)
lx =
1
[1 + (1 + i)]

1 +

'

, (36)
l =
1
1 + (1 + i)

1 +

'

  
'
. (37)
Substituting (35)-(37) into (23) and di¤erentiating U with respect to i yields
@U
@i
=  


i
1 + i

1
1 + (1 + i)

+
  1
[1 + (1 + i)]2

'+ 


ln z

< 0. (38)
Equation (38) shows that welfare is monotonically decreasing in i; therefore, Friedman rule
is always optimal when the CIA constraint on R&D investment is absent.
22We report the welfare gain as the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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Proposition 6 When the Schumpeterian growth model features only the CIA constraint on
consumption, Friedman rule is always optimal regardless of whether the equilibrium features
R&D overinvestment or underinvestment.
Proof. Note (38).
Intuitively, under the CIA constraint on consumption, an increase in i decreases all of
flr; lx; lg. Furthermore, it can be shown that lr > 0 implies l > lji=0 in (37); therefore, any
increase in i that leads to a further reduction in l is socially suboptimal. Also, it is useful to
note that the e¤ects of i on lr and lx under the two CIA constraints are very di¤erent. Recall
that under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, an increase in i leads to a reallocation
of labor from R&D to production, but this reallocation e¤ect of i is absent under the CIA
constraint on consumption. From this analysis, we conclude that the CIA constraint on
R&D, which is absent in previous studies, is crucial to the suboptimality of Friedman rule.
4.2 Friedman rule under CIA on manufacturing and R&D
In this subsection, we consider another alternative case in which the model features CIA
constraints on R&D and manufacturing. For simplicity, we assume inelastic labor supply.
To introduce a CIA constraint on manufacturing, we assume that the nancing of wage
payment to production workers also requires money borrowed from households. Similar to
the setup in the R&D sector, the cost of borrowing is Bt(j)
R t+t
t
isds  Bt(j)itt, and
we use  2 [0; 1] to parameterize the strength of this CIA constraint on manufacturing,
where  is the share of manufacturing expenditure that requires the borrowing of money
from households. In this case (following the logic of previous footnotes 14 and 15), the
total cost of manufacturing per unit time is (1 + it)wtLx;t(j). Therefore, the marginal cost
of production for the industry leader in industry j is mct(j) = (1 + it)wt=zqt(j), and the
markup is  = pt(j)=mct (j) as before. It can be shown that (9) remains unchanged whereas
(10) becomes
(1 + it)wtLx;t(j) =

1


pt(j)xt(j) =

1


yt. (39)
As for the zero-expected-prot condition for R&D, we now consider the more general CIA
constraint on R&D such that (12) becomes
vtt(k) = (1 + it)wtLr;t(k), (40)
where  2 [0; 1] is the share of R&D investment that requires the borrowing of money from
households. The rest of the model is the same as Section 2.
Following similar derivations as in Section 2.6, we nd that (17) becomes
(  1)(1 + i)lx = (lr + =')(1 + i). (41)
Combining this equation with lx + lr = 1 and performing a few steps of mathematical
manipulation yield
lr =
  1
  1 + (1 + i)=(1 + i)

1 +

'

  
'
. (42)
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Therefore, we nd that lr and g = (' ln z)lr are decreasing (increasing) in i if  >  ( < ).
Intuitively, an increase in i raises both the cost of production and the cost of R&D; however,
the relative strength of the opposing e¤ects of the CIA constraints is determined by  and
. The empirical evidence for a negative e¤ect of ination and the nominal interest rate on
total factor productivity growth documented in Evers et al. (2007) implies that  > ; in
other words, R&D requires a higher nancing cost than manufacturing.23
As for the optimal nominal interest rate i, equating (42) and (24) under  = 0 yields
the following condition that characterizes the interior optimal nominal interest rate.
1 + i
1 + i
=
  1
(1 + '=) ln z   1 . (43)
In this case, if  > , then we come to the same conclusion that i > 0 if and only if the
equilibrium features R&D overinvestment (i.e.,  > (1 + '=) ln z).24 However, if  < ,
then we come to the opposite conclusion that i > 0 if and only if the equilibrium features
R&D underinvestment (i.e.,  < (1 + '=) ln z).25 We summarize these results below.
Proposition 7 When there are CIA constraints on both R&D and production, R&D and
economic growth are decreasing (increasing) in the nominal interest rate if  >  ( < ).
Furthermore, if  >  ( < ), then R&D overinvestment (underinvestment) is necessary
and su¢ cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. If and only if the optimal nominal interest
rate is positive, then i achieves the rst-best allocations flr ; lxg.
Proof. Note (42) and compare it with (24) under  = 0. Also, note (43).
4.3 Friedman rule in a semi-endogenous growth model
In this subsection, we briey examine our results in a semi-endogenous growth model with
only the CIA constraint on R&D; see Segerstrom (1998) for a semi-endogenous-growth ver-
sion of the quality-ladder model. For simplicity, we focus on the case of inelastic labor supply
by setting  = 0, so that lr + lx = l = 1. To introduce semi-endogenous growth, we assume
an e¤ect of increasing complexity on innovation such that R&D productivity is decreasing
in aggregate technology Zt. In this case, (13) becomes
t =
'Lr;t
Zt
. (44)
Under this specication, the steady-state growth rate of Zt is determined by the exogenous
population growth rate such that g = n > 0. The rest of the model is the same as Section 2.
23In reality, it takes a long time for R&D scientists and engineers to create an invention; in contrast, it
takes much less time for manufacturing workers to produce products that are ready for sale. In both cases,
rms need to pay wages upfront implying that the degree of CIA is much higher in the case of R&D than in
the case of manufacturing.
24In order for i to achieve the rst-best allocation in this case,  needs to be su¢ ciently larger than 
such that  > (  1)=[(1 + '=) ln z   1].
25In order for i to achieve the rst-best allocation in this case,  needs to be su¢ ciently smaller than 
such that  < (  1)=[(1 + '=) ln z   1].
17
Following similar derivations as in Section 2.6, we nd that equilibrium R&D labor is
characterized by
lr
1  lr =
  1
1 + i


+ 

, (45)
where  = g= ln z = n= ln z is exogenous on the balanced growth path. Equation (45) shows
that equilibrium R&D lr is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i as before. Using standard
dynamic optimization, we maximize (1) subject to (a) ct = Ztlx;t, (b) _Zt = (' ln z)lr;tNt, and
(c) lr;t+ lx;t = 1. We nd that the rst-best optimal allocation on the balanced growth path
is characterized by
lr
1  lr
=
n
+ n
. (46)
Equating (45) and (46) yields the optimal nominal interest rate i given by
i = max

(  1)


+ 

+ n
n
  1; 0

, (47)
where  = n= ln z. Therefore, we come to the same conclusion in the monetary semi-
endogenous growth model that Friedman rule is suboptimal (i.e., i > 0) if and only if the
equilibrium features R&D overinvestment (i.e., lrji=0 > lr).
Proposition 8 In a semi-endogenous growth model with a CIA constraint on R&D in-
vestment and inelastic labor supply, the optimal nominal interest rate i is given by (47).
Furthermore, if and only if R&D overinvestment occurs in the zero-nominal-interest-rate
equilibrium, then the optimal nominal interest rate would be strictly positive; in this case,
Friedman rule is suboptimal. Finally, if and only if the optimal nominal interest rate is
positive, then i achieves the rst-best allocations flr ; lxg.
Proof. Compare (45) with (46) and note (47). Then, a few steps of mathematical manipu-
lation show that lrji=0 > lr , i > 0.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the long-run growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
in a Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints. Although we nd that R&D and
economic growth are decreasing in the nominal interest rate, a zero interest rate policy
does not necessarily maximize social welfare. Specically, we nd that the suboptimality
or optimality of Friedman rule is closely related to a seemingly unrelated issue that is the
overinvestment versus underinvestment of R&D in the market economy, and this result is
robust to both the fully-endogenous-growth and semi-endogenous-growth versions of the
Schumpeterian model.
Finally, we conclude with a brief summary of our results and their intuition. Under
inelastic labor supply, the CIA constraint on consumption has no distortionary e¤ect on the
consumption-leisure decision; therefore, any e¤ect of monetary policy operates through the
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CIA constraint on R&D investment. If and only if there is too much R&D in equilibrium,
then a positive nominal interest rate that increases the cost of R&D would be optimal.
Under elastic labor supply, the CIA constraint on consumption distorts the consumption-
leisure decision; as a result, a positive nominal interest rate leads to a welfare cost through a
reduction in labor supply. In this case, R&D overinvestment is necessary but not su¢ cient for
a positive nominal interest rate to be optimal. In other words, in order for a positive nominal
interest rate to be optimal (i.e., Friedman rule being suboptimal), the welfare gain from
overcoming R&D overinvestment through the CIA constraint on R&D must dominate the
welfare loss from distorting leisure through the CIA constraint on consumption. Furthermore,
we have also considered an alternative version of the model with CIA constraints on R&D
and manufacturing. In this case, we nd that the optimality of Friedman rule depends on
the relative strength of the CIA constraints on R&D and manufacturing. If the e¤ect of
the CIA constraint on manufacturing dominates (is dominated by) the e¤ect of the CIA
constraint on R&D, then R&D underinvestment (overinvestment) would become a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
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Appendix A: Dynamics of the monetary Schumpeterian growth model
Proof of Proposition 1. We dene a transformed variable t  yt=vt, and its law of
motion is
_t
t
 _yt
yt
  _vt
vt
. (A1)
From the resource constraint yt = ctNt, the law of motion for yt is
_yt
yt
=
_ct
ct
+ n = rt   , (A2)
where the second equality comes from (5) and (3) because it = i for all t. From (11), the
law of motion for vt is :
vt
vt
= rt + t   t
vt
, (A3)
where t = 'lr;t and t = yt(  1)=. Substituting (A2) and (A3) into (A1) yields
_t
t


  1


t   'lr;t   . (A4)
To derive a relationship between lr;t and t, we rst make use of (10) and (12) to derive
lx;t =

1 + i
'

yt
vt
=

1 + i
'

t. (A5)
Then, combining (4) and (10) yields
lt = 1  (1 + i)lx;t. (A6)
Finally, combining (A5), (A6) and lt = lr;t + lx;t, we derive
lr;t = 1  [1 + (1 + i)]

1 + i
'

t. (A7)
Substituting (A7) into (A4) yields an autonomous dynamic system of t.
_t
t


  1 + (1 + i) [1 + (1 + i)]


t   ('+ ). (A8)
Therefore, the dynamics of t is characterized by saddle-point stability such that t jumps
immediately to its interior steady state given by
 =
('+ )
  1 + (1 + i) [1 + (1 + i)] . (A9)
Equations (A5) and (A7) imply that if  is stationary, then lx and lr must be stationary,
which in turn implies that l is stationary as well.
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